The Use of Public-Private Partnerships as a Model for the Delivery of Goods and Services to the Government - Is This a New Concept in Government Contracting? by Napoleon, Vincent J. et al.
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 3.0 United States License.  
 
This site is published by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh as 
part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is cosponsored by the University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2017) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) 
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2017.122 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
ARTICLES 
THE USE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AS A MODEL FOR 
THE DELIVERY OF GOODS AND SERVICES TO THE 
GOVERNMENT—IS THIS A NEW CONCEPT IN GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTING? 
Vincent J. Napoleon, Diana V. Vilmenay & Nia Newton 
 
Journal of Law & Commerce 
  
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2017) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2017.122 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
 
119 
ARTICLES 
THE USE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AS A MODEL FOR 
THE DELIVERY OF GOODS AND SERVICES TO THE 
GOVERNMENT—IS THIS A NEW CONCEPT IN GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTING? 
Vincent J. Napoleon, Diana V. Vilmenay & Nia Newton* 
I. Introduction ....................................................................................... 121 
II. P3s in Government Contracting Yesterday ....................................... 123 
III. Types of P3s ...................................................................................... 125 
A. Concession ................................................................................ 126 
B. Build-Own-Operate ................................................................... 127 
C. Build/Operate/Transfer .............................................................. 127 
D. Operations and Maintenance, and Management ....................... 128 
E. Design-Build-Operate ............................................................... 129 
IV. How P3s are Financed ...................................................................... 129 
V. Advantages of P3s in Government Contracting ................................ 131 
A. Risk Transfer ............................................................................. 132 
B. Cost Reduction .......................................................................... 134 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Vincent J. Napoleon received his J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, and 
received his B.S. B.A. from Georgetown University. Mr. Napoleon is a consulting attorney to and former 
partner with Nixon Peabody LLP and was the head of the firm’s Government Contracts team. He was also 
a member of the firm’s M&A and Corporate Transactions practice group. His practice consisted of 
advising on all aspects of federal, state, and local government contract law. Mr. Napoleon is also a retired 
U.S. Air Force colonel and was formerly the senior contracting official for the Air Force District of 
Washington and was a senior reservist to the deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force (Contracting). 
Diana V. Vilmenay received her J.D. from the Howard University Law School and her B.A. from 
Georgetown University. Ms. Vilmenay is an attorney with Gray Plant Mooty and is a member of the firm’s 
Franchise practice group. Nia Newton received her J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and her 
B.A. from Spelman College. Ms. Newton is an attorney with Nixon Peabody LLP and a member of the 
firm’s Franchise & Distribution and Corporate Transaction groups. 
120 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 35:119 
 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2017) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2017.122 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
C. Private Sector Incentives ........................................................... 135 
VI. Disadvantages of P3s in Government Contracting ........................... 135 
A. High Financing and Transaction Costs ..................................... 136 
B. Loss of Project Control and Revenues ...................................... 136 
C. Unforeseen Consequences ......................................................... 137 
VII. Factors to Determine Whether to Engage in a P3 ............................. 137 
VIII. P3s in Government Contracting Today ............................................. 138 
A. P3 in Sustainment and Depot-Level Maintenance .................... 140 
B. Corps of Engineers .................................................................... 144 
C. Transportation and Infrastructure .............................................. 147 
D. Homeland Security .................................................................... 150 
IX. Facilitating Other Uses of P3s .......................................................... 152 
A. White House Initiative to Expand P3s ...................................... 152 
B. Congressional P3 Action ........................................................... 154 
X. P3s in State and Local Government Contracting .............................. 155 
XI. Conclusion: P3s in Government Contracting Tomorrow .................. 161 
 
  
2017] THE USE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 121 
 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2017) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2017.122 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of current and recent events including a new presidential 
administration in the White House, global terrorism, and sequestration, the 
federal government continues to be confronted with budgetary challenges as 
it attempts to provide services to its citizens and provide for the common 
defense. As a result, there has been a growing interest and dependence by the 
federal government on the private sector to develop novel ways to provide 
goods and services that would result in minimum government investment 
with less government risk. This interest generally stems from factors such as 
budget restraints, project complexity, need for private sector resources and 
expertise, and the government’s ever-changing priorities.1 Equally, the 
private sector continues to rely on major Department of Defense (“DoD”) 
and other non-DoD programs and contracts to fuel shareholder value. 
Notwithstanding this continuous mutual dependence between the public and 
private sectors, questions remain as to whether public-private partnerships 
are a new concept in government contracting. In sum, public-private 
partnerships are not a new concept, but instead they have emerged to the 
forefront as public and private sector interdependence has revived public-
private partnerships in government contracting. 
At its core, the term “public-private partnership” or “P3” describes the 
contractual scenario in which the public sector partners with the private 
sector to complete a project that will benefit the public.2 To understand the 
P3 is to envision a project delivery model that exists somewhere between 
public project delivery (where the public agency owns and operates the asset) 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 See Robert Puentes & Patrick Sabol, Private Capital, Public Good: Drivers of Successful 
Infrastructure Public Private Partnerships, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.brookings 
.edu/research/reports2/2014/12/17-infrastructure-public-private-partnerships-sabol-puentes. 
2 The P3 concept was used as early as during the time of the Roman Empire under Caesar Augustus’ 
rule. Caesar Augustus authorized the Salassi tribe (a Celtic tribe that resided in the Alpine region of 
northern Italy and Gaul) to raise money (by way of tolls) from travelers crossing portions of the Saint 
Bernhard Pass in exchange for the tribe’s management of and assistance to travelers crossing the pass. 
See David Plunkett & Erin Minor, Public-Private Partnerships: Primer, Pointers & Potential Pitfalls, 
ABA BRIEFING PAPER (2013). See also Sarah Jamil, The Miscellaneous Desirability of P3s and an 
Approach to Design an Appropriate Constitution (Jan. 2008), https://www.wipo.uni-freiburg.de/dateien/ 
tagungen/reformen/the_miscellaneous_desirability_of_public.pdf; Vincent Napoleon & Diana Vilmenay, 
Public-Private Partnerships—Is this a New Concept in Government Contracting?, GOV’T CONTRACTS 
ALERT (Nixon Peabody LLP, Wash., D.C.), June 12, 2015, at 1. 
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and privatization (where the private sector owns and operates the asset). 
There are different types of P3s, but most forms share two important 
characteristics: (1) financial investment by the private sector and (2) risk 
transfer from the public sector to the private sector.3 Accordingly, P3s 
provide certain assets where governments often lack full financial resources 
and expertise and, as a consequence, look to the private sector to assist with 
developing infrastructure, among other important projects.4 
P3 projects differ from traditional procurement contracts in several 
respects. They are typically large, long-term endeavors over which the 
private partner holds a significant amount of control and inherits greater risk. 
When successful, P3s bring capital to the target market and create local job 
opportunities. When effective, they spur consumption, increase wealth, and 
promote stronger economies. “In certain circumstances, P3 projects can bring 
innovative solutions to infrastructure challenges . . . a broad array of 
interested and invested parties . . . substantial [project] experience . . . [and 
financial rigor and incentives from the private sector] to deliver project[s] 
on-time and on-budget.”5 P3 projects also tend to draw other private investors 
to the market, thus creating a stronger model for long-term economic growth. 
In the federal government contracting context, P3s are simply contracts 
between the government and the private sector contractor that often result in 
greater private sector participation in project delivery. In this respect, 
successful P3s serve as vehicles to improve government services at less cost 
to the taxpayers since, among other things, the cost burden shifts from the 
government to the private sector when completing a project. When used 
properly, P3s encourage the public and private sectors to cooperate, innovate, 
                                                                                                                           
 
3 IMF, Public-Private Partnerships, Fiscal Affairs Department (Mar. 12, 2013). 
4 Here the term “infrastructure” is used broadly to describe the “basic equipment and structures 
(such as roads and bridges) that are needed for a country, region, or organization to function properly” 
and “the resources (as personnel, buildings, or equipment) required for an activity” for the public. 
Infrastructure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
infrastructure (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
5 TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: FINDINGS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL PANEL ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 10 (2014) 
[hereinafter TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT]. 
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and collaborate with the ultimate objective of working toward a mutual goal 
of project success.6 
There has not been much case law regarding P3s, although United States 
jurisprudence is developing. For example, in LaSalle v. United States, the 
United States Court of Federal Claims clarified the difference between a P3 
contract and a commercial partnership agreement.7 The court found that 
while a commercial partnership is one in which two parties share risk, 
control, and profits, a public-private partnership generally shifts the risk, 
control, and profits to only one of the parties.8 
This Article examines P3s in the context of government contracting and 
how P3s are utilized to achieve the government objective of efficient 
execution and delivery of projects for the benefit of the citizenry. To this end, 
the Article begins by providing a historical context of P3s as well as a review 
of several common types of P3s. The Article additionally explores how a 
typical P3 is financed. Moving forward, the Article analyzes the advantages 
and disadvantages of the P3 model in government contracting and discusses 
several examples of P3s in use currently in the DoD and other government 
agencies. It explains how P3s are facilitated in other areas of the federal 
government and concludes with an examination of the use of P3s in state and 
local government. 
II. P3S IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING YESTERDAY 
There has been a recent trend towards reliance on P3s as a model for the 
delivery of goods and services to the federal government. However, the fact 
of the matter is that P3s are not new. While the term “public-private 
partnership” was not widely used in the United States until the 1990s, the 
leveraging of private-sector resources for the benefit of the public-sector is a 
concept that has been used for more than 300 years.9 For example, the 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 See John Foyer et al., Public-Private Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question, PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 475, 477 (2010), http://sites.duke.edu/niou/files/2011/05/Forrer-Lee-Newcomer-and-
Boyer-Public-Private-Partnership-and-the-Public-Accountability-Question.pdf. 
7 LaSalle v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 797, 810 (2001). 
8 Id. 
9 The P3 concept was used as early as during the time of the Roman Empire under Caesar Augustus’ 
rule. Caesar Augustus authorized the Salassi tribe (a Celtic tribe that resided in the Alpine region of 
northern Italy and Gaul) to raise money (by way of tolls) from travelers crossing portions of the Saint 
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Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War utilized the private 
sector (privateers) by permitting their harassment of the British navy.10 P3s 
also developed in the West through private sector construction of the nation’s 
transportation infrastructure, especially the cross-continental railway and the 
development of private tollways and canals.11 
It appears as though America’s first organized P3 was in 1652, when the 
private company Water Works Company of Boston built a channel to 
transport water to a reservoir for storage and to provide local residents with 
drinking water.12 Two years later, Richard Thurley, a contractor and colonist, 
named, designed, financed, and built the first legally implemented toll 
bridge.13 The toll bridge crossed the Newbury River in Massachusetts 
connecting two Massachusetts towns, and provided an important trading 
route for the residing colonists.14 In 1795, following the colonial period and 
the Revolutionary War, America’s new government had very little capital 
and the costs of completing a graded gravel road were too steep.15 
Nevertheless, there was still a need to develop the new nation’s 
infrastructure. The government used P3s for the development of the 
Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Road to, among other things, move 
produce from Lancaster County to Philadelphia.16 With the permission of the 
government, the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Road Company 
constructed the toll road with the objective of receiving payment from the 
                                                                                                                           
 
Bernhard Pass in exchange for the tribe’s management of and assistance to travelers crossing the pass. 
See citations supra note 2. 
10 Foyer et al., supra note 6, at 475; Napoleon & Vilmenay, supra note 2. 
11 Foyer et al., supra note 6, at 475; Napoleon & Vilmenay, supra note 2. 
12 Plunkett & Minor, supra note 2, at 3; Stephanie Satterfield & Leslie Sluger, How Do You Like 
Your Infrastructure: Public or Private?, SOC’Y FOR MKTG. PROF’L. SERVS. FOUND. 4 (2010), http:// 
www.ncppp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/PS-2010-HowDoYouLike.pdf. 
13 Plunkett & Minor, supra note 2, at 3. 
14 Id. 
15 Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Road [New Nation] Historical Marker, EXPLORE PA 
HISTORY, http://explorepahistory.com/hmarker.php?markerId=1-A-28D. 
16 Bernard Harris, Public-private Partnerships Reinventing PennDOT, LANCASTERONLINE 
(May 14, 2014), http://lancasteronline.com/news/local/public-private-partnerships-reinventing-penndot/ 
article_297fdb14-db9c-11e3-b9c8-001a4bcf6878.html. A new nation had no money to build 
infrastructure, so a private owner built the first long-distance, broken-stone-and-gravel surface, opening 
the territory northwest of the Ohio River. The turnpike was built to move produce and manufactured goods 
from Lancaster County to Philadelphia. The private owner of the road (the Philadelphia and Lancaster 
Turnpike Company) was repaid from tolls. The road was blocked by wooden gates, or “pikes,” that would 
be “turned” to open the road after the tolls were paid; thus, the term “turnpike.” 
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tolls collected for use of the road.17 After completion of the road, the 
government continued to amend and lengthen the company’s charter to help 
increase revenues, provide convenient routes, and fine toll evaders.18 The 
road has been identified as the first significant turnpike and the “beginning 
of organized road improvement after the long period of economic confusion 
following the American Revolution.”19 
It has been said that P3s are “the modus vivendi of America’s 
contemporary nonprofit sector largely because [P3s] are a basic characteristic 
of American politics and social welfare system—not by design but by 
happenstance.”20 This assessment is largely rooted in the fact that 
governments—at not only the federal level, but also the state and local 
levels—often lack the resources necessary to provide the depth and types of 
services and infrastructure necessary to support the underlying communities. 
III. TYPES OF P3S 
The type of P3 used is determined by “what rights, obligations, and risks 
are assumed by the public or private parties within the partnership.”21 In the 
traditional government contracts context, these rights, obligations, and risks 
are memorialized in a number of different forms and variations, including, 
but not limited to, Concession; Build-Own-Operate; Build/Operate/Transfer; 
Operations, Maintenance and Management; and Design-Build-Operate.22 
P3s are similar to traditional government contracts in that they inherently 
encompass a risk mitigation model that operates to balance the risk of a 
project between the contractor and the government.23 Shifting the risk burden 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 1795—The Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Road, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY 
ADMIN. (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/rakeman/1795.htm. 
20 Lynne Moulton & Helmut Anheier, Public-Private Partnerships in the United States: Historical 
Patterns and Current Trends, CIVIL SOC’Y WORKING PAPER 16, Feb. 2001, at 3, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
29058/1/CSWP_16_web.pdf. 
21 The World Bank, Attracting Investors to African Public-Private Partnerships: A Project 
Preparation Guide, at 8 (2009), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2588/ 
461310revised017808213773070Revised.pdf?sequence=1. 
22 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-99-71, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
TERMS RELATED TO BUILDING AND FACILITY PARTNERSHIPS (1999). 
23 See Napoleon & Vilmenay, supra note 2. 
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based on contract type—firm fixed price or cost plus reimbursement—along 
with ensuring the contractor provides a mix of specialized technical skills, 
innovation, and funding is a way in which the government engages the 
private sector and promotes interaction between the government agency and 
the private partner. 
A. Concession 
In a concession P3, a public authority grants a private sector “operator” 
responsibility for the operation, maintenance, financing, and management of 
an infrastructure asset while retaining ownership of the asset and receiving 
rights to the asset once the concession ends.24 Notably, under a concession, 
the private sector operator assumes the risk for the condition of the asset and 
for the investment itself.25 A concession P3 can cover an existing asset or 
utility or exist for a new building project.26 The concession period will 
generally last 25 to 30 years and the public’s payment for the use of the 
concession serves as the source of revenue for the operator.27 
One unique aspect of the concession is that the asset provides instant 
cash flow to pay the operator and to set aside funds to pay back the 
investment and/or to service the debt. Another unique aspect of the 
concession is the focus on output as opposed to input.28 For concessions, the 
operator will generally set the parameters for operation of the asset and 
performance standards. A typical example of a concession P3 is a toll road; 
the public sector partner leases to its private partner a toll road for 30 years 
in exchange for an upfront payment, one that the public sector partner will 
use to fund other projects and that the private partner will presumably make 
back in tolls paid by people using the road. The private partner will be 
responsible for operation and maintenance of the road, but once the term 
expires, the public sector partner will retain operational control. 
                                                                                                                           
 
24 Concessions, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Design-Build-Operate (DBO) Projects, 
WORLD BANK GRP. PUBLIC-PRIVATE P’SHIP IN INFRASTRUCTURE RES. CTR., http:// 
ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/agreements/concessions-bots-dbos [hereinafter P3 
RESOURCE]. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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B. Build-Own-Operate 
Under a Build-Own-Operate (“BOO”) transaction, the public sector 
does not own the facility and is not required to purchase or take title of the 
facility.29 Instead, a private sector contractor will be responsible for building 
and operating the facility.30 Unlike a regular private investment, BOO 
transactions typically have some continuing level of government 
involvement because there is either: (1) an essential public service of some 
kind with few suppliers of that service, or (2) a need for the government to 
exercise its power of coercion and reduce procedural obstacles in the way of 
a project’s start (i.e., eminent domain).31 Although the government does not 
provide direct funding, it may assist in offering other financial incentives 
such as tax-exempt status.32 This P3 type has some variations, which include 
build-develop-operate and design-build-finance-operate-maintenance.33 An 
example of a BOO P3 is a water treatment facility. The private company 
builds and runs the water facility by processing raw water into filtered water, 
and the public sector utility subsequently delivers the water to customers. 
C. Build/Operate/Transfer 
In a Build/Operate/Transfer (“BOT”) project, the private sector is 
authorized to build and operate a facility or system generally built and 
operated by the public sector. The private sector would be granted the right 
from the public sector to operate this facility or system for the period of a 
concession term, and would ultimately be responsible for the project’s 
financing. Typically, a concession term could range from 25 to 30 years 
depending on the project. The duration serves as an incentive to participate 
in government projects by allowing the private-sector partner enough time to 
recover its return on investment. Once the term ends, the facility or system 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 Types of Partnerships, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE P’SHIPS, http:// www.ncppp.org/ 
ppp-basics/types-of-partnerships/ [hereinafter NCPPP]. 
30 Id. 
31 John Quiggin, Professor of Economics, James Cook University, Presentation made to the 
conference, BOOT: In the Public Interest? (Mar. 1998), http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/johnquiggin/ 
Conference/BOOT.html. 
32 NCPPP, supra note 29. 
33 P3 RESOURCE, supra note 24. 
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would be transferred to the public authority. The BOT has been called a 
classic tool for project finance, because, for example, “the revenues are often 
obtained from a single ‘offtake purchaser’ such as a utility or government, 
who purchases project output from the project company.”34 
Unlike the concession P3, there is no instant revenue stream from the 
facility or system.35 Railways, for example, have been developed using the 
BOT model. The public sector partner chooses a private partner to build the 
railway, and the private partner then starts to implement the project when it 
forms a team, executes studies, obtains financing and permits, and proceeds 
with design development.36 Once the design is approved by the public 
partner, construction of the railway begins. Upon completion of the railway, 
the railway opens for public use and repayment of the railway to the private 
partner is covered by incoming revenues.37 After a predetermined term, the 
private partner transfers ownership of the facility to the public sector partner 
and the public sector then owns and operates the railway. 
D. Operations, Maintenance, and Management 
In an Operations and Maintenance (“OM”) project, a public partner 
contracts with a private partner to provide and/or maintain an already existing 
service.38 While the public partner remains obligated to provide the service, 
day-to-day management rests with the private sector. The simplest OM 
model does not usually shift risk of asset conditions to the private partner but 
alternatively pays the private partner a fixed fee that covers the performance 
of specific tasks and accompanying expenses. An OM contract will typically 
last 3 to 5 years, and holds relatively little revenue risk for the private partner. 
An Operations, Maintenance, and Management (“OMM”) project is typically 
the same as the OM model, however, OMMs have longer termed projects 
that provide private partners more time and opportunity to make their own 
capital investments and earn reasonable returns.39 The OM and OMM models 
have been used for water and, to a more limited extent, the energy sector. 
                                                                                                                           
 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 See generally id. 
37 See id. 
38 NCPPP, supra note 29. 
39 Id. 
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E. Design-Build-Operate 
In a Design-Build-Operate (“DBO”) project, a single contract is 
awarded to a private contractor to design, construct, and operate a new 
project until a contractually-agreed output, while the public sector maintains 
ownership and finances the project.40 Unlike most public and private sector 
contracts where the design, construction, and management would be 
considered separate projects contracted for individually, the DBO method 
streamlines the process with a simple design-build approach. By giving one 
private entity the responsibility of multiple stages of a project, the public 
sector reduces the risk of issues going unnoticed or overlooked. 
IV. HOW P3S ARE FINANCED 
The availability of and access to funds is an important element in 
determining the success of government sponsored projects utilizing the P3 
model. Given the limited funding provided by federal, state, and local 
governments to support public projects, financing not only becomes a major 
component of the P3 arrangement, it also becomes a major reason and 
motivator behind why public sector entities engage in P3 structured 
transactions. 
There are a variety of models available for financing P3 infrastructure 
projects. One financing model is government funding. Government funding 
is typically used in DBO projects where a government or public authority 
will source projects through traditional procurement methods and contract 
with a private company to design, build, operate, and maintain the asset. 
Documentation for this arrangement revolves around a contract between the 
sponsoring public authority and the private company. In addition, the public 
authority consummates an operating agreement with the private company.41 
There is also the “Corporate or On-Balance Sheet Financing” model.42 
Under this model, the private sector obtains financing based on its own 
                                                                                                                           
 
40 Id. 
41 See NCPPP, supra note 29. 
42 Main Financing Mechanisms for Infrastructure Projects, WORLD BANK GRP. PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
P’SHIP IN INFRASTRUCTURE RES. CTR. (Feb. 16, 2016), http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/financing/mechanisms [hereinafter Main Financing Mechanisms]. 
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credit-worthiness rather than the “invest-ability” of the project.43 Private 
partners are able to go to capital and equity markets and seek investors 
through equity shareholders, debt from banks, or potentially third-party-
issued bonds. This financing model is typically used in less complex and 
lower-value projects.44 
The most widely used financing model is Project Finance.45 Project 
Finance is the result of direct investment by private sector investors using the 
capital markets or limited-recourse lending to a specially created project 
vehicle to support infrastructure projects.46 Generally, in the Project Finance 
model, the project sponsors and investors will establish a specially created 
project vehicle or a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) to sign the P3 contract 
with the public sector party and act as the borrower for project capital.47 The 
SPV is usually established as a separate legal entity to diminish liability for 
any parent company by financing large projects separate and apart from its 
parent’s balance sheets. 
Generally, P3 projects are financed in a similar fashion as project 
finance arrangements. Lenders and investors in these arrangements use non-
recourse financing or limited-recourse financing, which are reliant on the 
project’s generated cash flow to recompense debts and produce returns for 
investors. A project’s likelihood of generating cash flow is indeed a lender’s 
primary assessment factor to determine a project’s overall risk, thus the terms 
of the project’s underlying contract are essential to securing financing.48 
Many P3 projects are funded with a mix of long-term debt finance and 
equity financing. According to the Progressive Policy Institute, long-term 
debt finance represents approximately 80 percent of the total funding 
required, while the other 20 percent of financing is represented by equity 
                                                                                                                           
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See id. This is referred to as a project’s bankability. A project is bankable when lenders are 
willing to finance the project. Banks will look to the cash flow of a project as the primary source of 
security for the loan. This is quite different from corporate financing, the more usual basis on which banks 
lend to businesses, where lenders rely on the value of the company’s assets. See Bankability, THE EPEC 
PPP GUIDE, www.eib.org/epec/g2g/i-project-identification/12/123/index (last visited July 5, 2016). 
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investments, depending on each project’s perceived risks.49 Debt financing is 
primarily used because it is generally less risky than equity financing. 
However, lenders typically require some type of equity funding for P3 deals 
to bridge the gap between available monies and monies required to pay the 
debt. Consequently, investors and the primary contractors will generally 
provide the equity financing. In some instances, the government may help 
provide capital for the initial costs of the project through grants or other 
means. If the project’s cash flow does not match the debt financing, the 
difference must typically be covered by a government guarantee.50 
Other projects are funded through varying combinations of private 
equity, corporate financing, government funding, bonds, and private capital 
inflows or other unique sources. For example, infrastructure bonds, project 
facilities, equity, and guarantees are just a few of the financing sources that 
are used to facilitate a P3.51 Ultimately, there is no one-size-fits-all solution 
to finance a P3 project, so the type and source of financing used in the P3 
infrastructure project depends on the phase of the project cycle. 
V. ADVANTAGES OF P3S IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 
P3s offer various potential advantages to the government. How 
advantageous a P3 will be is largely dependent upon the project itself, the 
structure of the P3, and the parties involved. One significant advantage of 
P3s is their flexibility. More specifically, P3s offer public sector decision-
makers an opportunity to improve the delivery of services and the 
management of facilities.52 P3s also help to mobilize private capital, which 
                                                                                                                           
 
49 Diana Carew, How Public-Private Partnerships Can Get America Moving Again, PROGRESSIVE 
POL’Y INST. 15 (May 2014), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/2014.05-
Carew_How-Public-Private-Partnerships-Can-Get-America-Moving-Again.pdf. 
50 Id. 
51 Infrastructure or project bonds are typically issued to support the operations phase of the project’s 
life cycle. During this phase, the bonds are substantially de-risked and operations cash flows are more 
certain and allow the project to meet its debt service. See The Future of P3s in the US: Financing the 
Funding Gap for Infrastructure, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (July 2013), https://www.financierworldwide 
.com/the-future-of-p3s-in-the-us-financing-the-funding-gap-for-infrastructure/#.WK6JBhIrL-Z 
[hereinafter Strategic Infrastructure Steps]. 
52 Government Objectives: Benefits and Risks of PPPs, WORLD BANK GRP. PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
P’SHIP IN INFRASTRUCTURE RES. CTR., http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/ 
overview/ppp-objectives (last updated Oct. 31, 2016) [hereinafter Benefits and Risks of PPPs]. 
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ultimately facilitates the development and accelerates the delivery of 
infrastructure projects.53 Use of the P3 project delivery model may help to 
filter out economically underproductive projects. P3s may also result in 
reducing the delay in project implementation and the investment in 
technologies and process innovations, which, in turn, may reduce project life-
cycle costs.54 
Other advantages include, but are not limited to, risk transfer, cost 
reduction, and private sector incentives, which are discussed in depth below. 
A. Risk Transfer 
One significant beneficial characteristic of P3s is risk transfer. P3s allow 
the government to shift some or all risks associated with the project to the 
private sector party. The government typically retains control and oversight 
of the project during both the design and construction phase and the 
operations and ongoing maintenance phase. For projects which the 
government is responsible for some or all of the financing, the liabilities are 
typically limited and tailored.55 The transfer of risks for projects are 
negotiated and bargained for, and provide long-term value-for-money 
propositions for the government.56 
P3s “involve a range of different risks.”57 These, as a general matter, are 
categorized as construction risk, financial risk, performance risk, demand 
risk, and residual risk.58 Each of these risks is assessed and measured in 
accordance with the project’s existence in the project life cycle.59 
Construction risk is typically associated with “design problems, building cost 
overruns, and project delays.”60 Financial risk “is related to variability in 
interest rates, exchange rates, and other factors affecting financing costs.”61 
                                                                                                                           
 
53 Strategic Infrastructure Steps, supra note 51; Plunkett & Minor, supra note 2, at 5. 
54 Strategic Infrastructure Steps, supra note 51. 
55 Government Risk Management, WORLD BANK GRP. PUBLIC-PRIVATE P’SHIP IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE RES. CTR., http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/financing/government 
-risk-management (last updated Oct. 31, 2016). 
56 See id. 
57 IMF, supra note 3, at 11. 
58 Id. at 11–12. 
59 See id. 
60 Id. at 11. 
61 Id. 
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Performance risk “is related to the availability of an asset, and the continuity 
and quality of service provision.”62 Demand risk is the risk “related to the 
ongoing need for services.”63 And finally, residual risk “is related to the 
future market price of an asset.”64 
Although investors consider the risks involved with P3 projects as 
major, they nonetheless acknowledge that P3 investments can be 
economically beneficial. Different types of risk mitigating instruments such 
as partial risks guarantees, government exchange guarantees, currency 
hedging, first loss guarantees, political risk insurance, debt and equity 
insurance, viability gap financing, and local currency bonds, may be offered 
to attract investors and mitigate risks.65 
A significant element to evaluate the risk and predict success under the 
P3 delivery model includes understanding how risk is allocated. Risk 
allocation requires dividing or sharing the risk and the responsibility for 
dealing with the risk’s consequences between the parties. Risk transfer 
allows the government to relieve itself of risks that are better managed by the 
private sector. As part of this risk transfer process, the government should 
assess the value of taking on a project’s risk. Based upon that valuation, it 
should determine the proper allocation of risks between itself and the private 
sector.66 In this regard, governments ultimately make distinctions between 
project-specific risks and “[m]arket risk, which reflects underlying economic 
developments that affect all projects, is not diversifiable and therefore has to 
be properly priced.”67 
Finally, it is important to note that a P3 structure includes not only the 
contractual relationship between the public and private sectors, but also the 
network of contracts between private sector parties, banks, insurance carriers, 
and others that serve to allocate risk among P3 participants. 
                                                                                                                           
 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 11–12. 
65 According to the World Bank, partial risk guarantees, for example, typically cover outstanding 
principal and accrued interest and help to protect private lenders against the risk of a public entity failing 
to perform its obligations with respect to a private project and help to ensure payment in the event of the 
public entity’s default from nonperformance of contractual obligations undertaken by governments or 
their agencies in private sector projects. See Partial Risk Guarantees (PRG), THE WORLD BANK, 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=3985219&pagePK=64143534&contentMD
K=20260268&menuPK=64143504&piPK=64143448 (last visited July 5, 2016). 
66 IMF, supra note 3, at 13–14. 
67 Id. at 13. 
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B. Cost Reduction 
The private sector generally carries the majority of responsibility for 
most P3 projects and, as a result, the government’s administrative and other 
indirect costs are reduced and/or transferred completely to the private sector. 
This transfer of costs and increase in responsibility motivates the private 
sector to better manage and consider a project’s overall costs rather than the 
costs for discrete portions of the project. 
Costs are reduced at the state and local level due to P3 projects. The host 
government to a project might issue bonds to raise funds necessary for 
infrastructure projects.68 When projects are financed by the private sector, the 
government can begin and finish necessary projects without making 
significant capital investments, thus reducing government debt and the 
addition of new debt.69 Consequently, P3s financed by the private sector free 
up government budgets to fund or better prioritize the budget for other 
initiatives.70 
Due to public sector budget constraints and the inability or lack of will 
of governments to raise taxes or incur additional debt to finance a project, 
P3s provide an additional avenue through which certain projects can be 
realized. P3s inherently make for better planning, management, operational, 
and cost efficiency. Because payments for P3 projects are usually spread out, 
due over time, or after the completion of various stages, a project’s funding 
allocation can be properly planned in advance. The ability for the private 
sector to use its expertise in both financial and operational strategy reduces 
the financial burdens typically associated with expensive and long-term 
projects, and can ultimately offer better public services through improved 
operational efficiency.71 
                                                                                                                           
 
68 Sources of Financing and Intercreditor Agreement, WORLD BANK GRP. PUBLIC-PRIVATE P’SHIP 
IN INFRASTRUCTURE RES. CTR., http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/financing/sources 
(last updated Sept. 6, 2016). 
69 Puentes & Sabol, supra note 1, at 8. 
70 Id. at 2. 
71 Id. at 10–11. 
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C. Private Sector Incentives 
Because the private sector party typically incurs debt to finance the 
project, the private sector party is motivated to manage the project efficiently 
and correctly from the onset.72 This finance-oriented mindset helps to avoid 
under-bidding, where a party purposely bids low to win the contract but then 
bills the government for additional charges to complete the project. 
Additionally, having the private sector party finance the deal allows for 
quicker completion of projects without the uncertainty of public funding 
whereas government grants, allocated budgets, or taxes may sometimes 
result in delays or cancellation of the project after commencement.73 
Using a P3 causes the government to rely less on budget allocations for 
significant projects.74 Typically, government-operated and managed projects 
require annual budget appropriations. This annual allocation of funds is not 
guaranteed and the amount allocated often fluctuates. Ongoing maintenance 
and operation of the project, to which some resources have already been 
donated, may lose priority over other issues and can eventually lose funding 
altogether. 
VI. DISADVANTAGES OF P3S IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 
Notwithstanding the various benefits inherent in P3s, there are also 
inherent risks in any long-term project, so the P3 model may not always be 
the best option for certain projects. P3s have been criticized for prioritizing 
profit maximization for the private sector party, loss of jobs of public 
employees, and the over-complexity of financing and deal structures.75 Other 
potential disadvantages of using P3s include high financing and transaction 
costs, loss of project control and revenues, and a number of unforeseeable 
consequences. 
                                                                                                                           
 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 7. 
75 Plunkett & Minor, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
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A. High Financing and Transaction Costs 
P3s do not necessarily rid the government of all costs associated with 
the project. For example, there may be higher transaction costs from due 
diligence associated with vetting different private sector candidates. There 
can also be additional costs associated with drafting and negotiating various 
P3 project agreements, although P3-enabling legislation and statutes have the 
power to standardize the language and disclosure requirements of P3 
contracts.76 
For the private sector party, a potential disadvantage to the P3 model 
could be the higher costs associated with financing the project.77 However, 
high costs could very well be offset by overall cost savings stemming from 
private sector efficiencies. The P3 project could also be structured in a way 
that the government obtains initial financing while shifting only the 
operational, construction, and/or management risks to the private sector.78 
Additionally, in certain state and local jurisdictions and for certain projects, 
the government may issue the private sector tax-exempt bonds to help offset 
higher transaction costs.79 
B. Loss of Project Control and Revenues 
The government loses control in the P3 arrangements where it assigns 
the private sector substantial control and day-to-day operational management 
of a project.80 Furthermore, certain projects can be negotiated to allow for 
lump-sum payments to the government or certain revenue-sharing 
agreements on an ongoing basis, leaving the government with no rights to 
transfer revenues from the project.81 However, such loss of control is often 
                                                                                                                           
 
76 Id. at 7. 
77 Id. at 5–6. 
78 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP CONCESSIONS 
FOR HIGHWAY PROJECTS: A PRIMER 5, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/pdfs/p3/p3_concession_primer.pdf 
(last visited July 5, 2016). 
79 Public Private Partnerships: Issues and Considerations, PRACTICAL L. CO. 2 (2013), http:// 
apps.americanbar.org/webupload/commupload/CL113000/sitesofinterest_files/PublicPrivatePartnership
sIssuesandConsiderations.pdf. 
80 Id. at 3. 
81 Id. at 5. 
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balanced by the fact that the government no longer is responsible for the 
operation and ongoing maintenance of the project.82 
C. Unforeseen Consequences 
P3s are often used for large-scale and long-term projects and thus there 
may be greater probability of unforeseen issues. Some issues that could arise 
over the life of the project include disputes over certain interpretations of the 
terms in the P3 project documents, the private sector party being acquired by 
another larger, unknown company, or the private sector party going out of 
business.83 There is also the potential for a long-term P3 to “lock-in” certain 
government spending depending on the operational needs at the time the 
contract is negotiated.84 This could be an issue for the public sector partner 
when shifting government priorities also calls for a change in funding 
allocations. Such unforeseen consequences could result in delays and/or 
additional losses to the government. 
VII. FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO ENGAGE IN A P3 
P3s should not be used for all projects, and significant due diligence 
should be conducted before deciding to use a P3 structure for a particular 
infrastructure project. Certain items the government should evaluate in its 
decision to use P3s include whether:85 
● The project involves significant capital investment; 
● The government has the necessary funds to operate and maintain 
the project on a long-term or ongoing basis; 
● The project requires technical or highly specialized knowledge; 
● The project provides a service or benefit that should be provided 
by the government. This analysis includes the nature and location, 
                                                                                                                           
 
82 Plunkett & Minor, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
83 Maximizing State Benefits from Public-Private Partnerships, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE 
(Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/trns/partnerships/P3_110712.aspx [hereinafter LAO]. 
84 Id. 
85 See generally Value-for-Money Analysis—Practices and Challenges: How Governments Choose 
When to Use PPP to Deliver Public Infrastructure and Services, WORLD BANK GLOBAL ROUND-TABLE 
(May 28, 2013), http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/VFM_0.pdf. 
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political implications, and the public and community needs of the 
project; 
● A private sector party can provide the same services or benefits 
more efficiently; 
● It is feasible to provide oversight and monitor the private sector 
party to ensure the project is completed on time and ongoing 
operations and maintenance are properly handled; and 
● The government would forgo any revenues it would have otherwise 
received from the project after overhead and expenses.86 
A value-for-money analysis is often used to assist the government in 
determining whether a P3 structure is the correct vehicle to use for a 
particular project.87 The value-for-money analysis measures the costs of a 
project using the traditional procurement method versus the P3 structure.88 
This determination is not always dependent upon which approach is cheaper, 
as the government must determine the costs over the life of the project and 
factor in any ongoing operational and maintenance costs. Additionally, this 
comparative analysis must account for all procurement options and the 
consequences of not starting the project at all.89 Ultimately, the needs of the 
public or greater community for the particular project must outweigh the 
overall costs and consequences of starting and completing the project.90 
VIII. P3S IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING TODAY 
Indeed, P3s, as a model within the context of federal government 
contracting, are not a new phenomenon. Growing in significant popularity, 
P3s have become the “go-to” form of government contracting particularly in 
                                                                                                                           
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. The value-for-money analysis also includes the following: the allocation of risks between the 
government and the private sector party, including any applicable construction costs overruns, unexpected 
operational and maintenance costs, and any other unexpected costs over the life of the project; the net 
costs of the project over the life of the project; the net value of any payments the government would 
receive from the private sector party; the net value of the benefits provided to the public for the life of the 
project; the technical and specialized skills and efficiencies the private sector party can bring to the project; 
the ability of the government to start and complete the project without private sector financing and 
participation; and any residual value of the project after the life of the project. 
88 Id. at 9–10. 
89 Id. at 10 n.2. 
90 Id. 
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an environment of fiscal deficits.91 The use of P3s as a means of improving 
government operations is an issue to which Congress has given serious 
attention.92 For example, the congressionally-mandated Commercial 
Activities Panel, chaired by the comptroller general of the United States, 
issued a report in 2002 endorsing the use of P3s in government contracting.93 
This endorsement comes on the heels of recognizing the government’s 
redefining role in managing public facilities, transportation, and 
infrastructure on land and in water. Additionally, Congress’ interest in P3s is 
the result of the DoD’s involvement over the last 20 years in P3 arrangements 
with contractors for the management and production of critical military items 
and assets as part of its depot-level maintenance program.94 
Other examples of the DoD’s use of P3s to expedite projects include 
Army projects focused on energy conservation, soldier family housing, and 
army-run hotels (“army lodges”), all of which have been acclaimed as 
successful ventures.95 The Navy has also engaged P3 strategies to solve 
“infrastructure, real property, and energy problems.”96 Even the Air Force 
has found creative ways to successfully leverage Air Force assets to attract 
more than $8.3 billion in private investment by authorizing “enhanced use 
leases” to the private sector for underused facilities on Air Force bases.97 
                                                                                                                           
 
91 See David M. Walker, Improving the Sourcing Decisions of the Government, COMMERCIAL 
ACTIVITIES PANEL 1 (Apr. 30, 2002), http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/202027.pdf. Section 832 of the 
Floyd Spence National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001 required the comptroller general 
to convene a panel of experts to study the policies and procedures governing the transfer of commercial 
activities for the federal government from government to contractor personnel. Id. 
92 See Federal Funds Could Spark Transport P3s, P3 BULLETIN (Mar. 16, 2015), http:// 
www.p3bulletin.com/news/view/87200. 
93 See generally Walker, supra note 91. 
94 Id. See also 10 U.S.C. § 2460 (2016). 
95 John Smolen, Congressional P3 Caucus Reconvenes to Consider P3 Solutions for Department 
of Defense Infrastructure, NOSSAMAN LLP (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.infrainsightblog.com/2014/04/ 
articles/policy/congressional-p3-caucus-reconvenes-to-consider-p3-solutions-for-department-of-
defense-infrastructure/. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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A. P3 in Sustainment and Depot-Level Maintenance 
The DoD, over the last couple of decades, has been engaged in 
establishing a more fully integrated defense sustainment industrial base.98 As 
a policy and statutory matter, the DoD promotes the use of P3s as a way to 
leverage private sector capabilities in the delivery of goods and services to 
the government. For example, the DoD mandates using P3s in defense 
sustainment and in depot-level maintenance communities.99 More 
specifically, the DoD directs that all “sustainment strategies shall include the 
best use of public and private sector capabilities through 
government/industry partnering initiatives.”100 In addition, the DoD states 
that “P3s for depot-level maintenance shall be employed whenever cost 
effective in providing improved support to the Warfighter, and to maximize 
the utilization of the government’s facilities, equipment, and personnel at 
DoD depot-level maintenance activities.”101 
In the last ten years, the government has increasingly partnered with the 
private sector to sustain core depot-maintenance capabilities, use 
underutilized public facilities, and leverage private sector investment in 
military facilities.102 In a 2003 GAO study (the “Study”) to address the extent 
to which the DoD is participating in P3s for depot maintenance, it was 
determined that partnerships between military depots and contractors were 
formed for a variety of reasons.103 These reasons include, but are not limited 
                                                                                                                           
 
98 See Colonel Tom D. Miller, 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings: The Defense 
Sustainment Industrial Base—A Primer, BROOKINGS INST. (June 30, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/research/files/papers/2010/6/30-defense-industrial-base-miller/0630_defense_industrial_base 
_miller.pdf (describing, among other things, the defense sustainment industrial base as the “package of 
support functions required to maintain the readiness and operational capability of weapon systems, 
subsystems, software[,] and support systems”). 
99 See 10 U.S.C. § 2460 (2016). The term “depot-level maintenance and repair” means material 
maintenance or repair requiring the overhaul, upgrading, or rebuilding of parts, assemblies, or 
subassemblies, and the testing and reclamation of equipment as necessary, regardless of the source of 
funds for the maintenance or repair or the location at which the maintenance or repair is performed. 
100 See Dep’t of Defense, DoD Directive No. 5000.01, THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
(May 12, 2007), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500001p.pdf. 
101 See Dep’t of Defense, DoD Instruction No. 4151.21, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR 
DEPOT-LEVEL MAINTENANCE (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/ 
415121p.pdf. 
102 See 10 U.S.C. § 2474 (2016). 
103 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-423, DEPOT MAINTENANCE: PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS HAVE INCREASED, BUT LONG-TERM GROWTH AND RESULTS ARE UNCERTAIN 1 
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to, maximizing the use and capacity at depots, fostering collaboration 
between the military and private industry, contractors seeking depots for their 
unique capabilities and advantageous depot labor rates, and facilitation of 
workforce sharing.104 Thus, presently, P3s are a key component of DoD 
product-support strategies to achieve affordable operational readiness for the 
warfighter.105 
The DoD uses three basic types of P3 approaches to depot-level 
maintenance: (i) Workshare, (ii) Direct Sale, and (iii) Lease arrangements.106 
Other partnership approaches recognized by the DoD include Teaming and 
Government-Furnished Resources.107 
The Department of Defense Public-Private Partnering for Sustainment 
Guidebook (the “Guidebook”) defines Workshare as a “partnership in which 
a government buying activity, in collaboration with a contractor and a depot 
maintenance activity, determines the best mix of work by capitalizing on 
each partner’s capabilities.”108 The workload is then allocated to each partner. 
The contractor is funded through a contract, and the organic activity is funded 
through a project or work order (in the case of depot maintenance). The 
partnering agreement focuses on the roles and responsibilities of each partner 
and the partners work jointly to accomplish the overall requirement. Partners 
under a workshare agreement do not exchange funds, consequently ridding 
the need for specific legal authority over the agreement.109 
The Guidebook defines Direct Sale as “an arrangement . . . whereby 
military and commercial entities enter into a contractual relationship for the 
use of depot maintenance facilities and employees to sell depot maintenance 
                                                                                                                           
 
(2003), http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/237827.pdf [hereinafter GAO P3 STUDY]. The study that occurred 
from February 2002 through February 2003 involved the review of 90 of the 93 partnerships the DoD 
identified as ongoing during fiscal year 2002, along with visits to 14 of the DoD’s 20 major maintenance 
depots where partnerships were ongoing. Id. 
104 Id. at 45. 
105 See Dave Floyd & Tom Gorman, Public-Private Partnerships, The Key to Retaining 
Government and Industry Capabilities, DEFENSE AT&L (2013), http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/ 
ATL%20Docs/Jan_Feb_2013/Floyd_Gorman.pdf. 
106 See Dep’t of Defense: Public-Private Partnering for Sustainment Guidebook, ACQUISITION 
CMTY. CONNECTION 3 (Feb. 1, 2012), https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/495747/file/62530/Public-
Private%20Partnering%20for%20Sustainment%20Guidebook%20(1%20Feb%2012).pdf [hereinafter 
Guidebook]. 
107 GAO P3 STUDY, supra note 103, at 48–49. 
108 Guidebook, supra note 106. 
109 Id. 
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articles and/or services to an outside (non-government) entity, usually a 
contractor.”110 A direct sale agreement begins with a government contract 
that funds a commercial activity. In turn, after development of a partnership 
agreement with an appropriate implementing agreement, the contractor pays 
an organic depot maintenance activity (or other industrial-funded activity as 
authorized) for goods and services provided to the contractor. Depending on 
the legal authority applied, the funds may be paid to the United States 
Treasury or directly to the depot’s working capital fund. The contractor may 
also supply material to the depots in support of the partnership. 
The purchase of articles or services by the commercial entity establishes 
a quasi-subcontractor relationship for the depot, which ensures (as authorized 
by law) that the depot be held accountable for willful misconduct or gross 
negligence, or from the failure of the government to comply with cost, 
schedule, or cost performance requirements in the contract agreement.111 
A Lease under the Guidebook is an arrangement where the government 
grants the private sector entity access to and use of government facilities and 
equipment.112 Although the depot maintenance performing its mission is 
priority, providing access and use of government facilities and equipment to 
the private sector results in more efficient use of government-owned 
facilities.113 Furthermore, revenues or “in-kind” payments earned by such a 
lease arrangement strengthens the government’s financial position and 
assures use of equipment that typically goes unused for long periods of 
time.114 
With respect to other partnership approaches recognized by the DoD, 
the 2003 GAO study on DoD’s use of P3s recognized “Teaming” as an 
arrangement whereby military and commercial entities enter into a 
                                                                                                                           
 
110 Id. at 4. See also GAO P3 STUDY, supra note 103, at 47. According to the GAO study examining, 
among other things, the frequency of partnership approaches used in the depot maintenance environment, 
direct sale is the most frequently used approach. Id. 
111 Guidebook, supra note 106, at 4 (“Primary legal authorities for direct sales agreements are found 
in 10 U.S.C. § 2474, which authorizes the payment from non-government entities to the working capital 
fund for articles and services produced. Additional authority for the ‘sale of articles and services’ is in 10 
U.S.C. §§ 2208(j), 2563, 4543, 4544, 7300, and 22 U.S.C. § 2770 for specified circumstances.”). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. (“In-kind” consideration includes the provision of property maintenance, protection, 
alteration, repair, improvement, and restoration; construction of new facilities; provision of facilities; and 
provision or payment of utility services.); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2667 (2016); 10 U.S.C. § 2474. 
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contractual relationship to assist one another in completing a project by a 
certain date.115 Typically, the teaming agreement will lay out the deliverables 
and work relationship between the military and commercial entities.116 Once 
a contract award is granted, these relationships are generally labeled 
contract/subcontractor relationships.117 
Government-Furnished Resources, on the other hand, involve an 
arrangement whereby the government permits the use of its depot 
maintenance facilities and/ or its equipment and employees by the private 
sector at no charge.”118 
In addition to P3s for depot-level maintenance, the DoD instructs that 
Performance-Based Logistics implementation strategies shall consider P3s to 
satisfy the core logistic capabilities requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 2464 and the 
limitations on the performance of depot-level maintenance and material 
requirements contained in 10 U.S.C. § 2466.119 As the DoD continues with 
its P3 mandates, senior officials and contractors have collectively identified 
at least 14 characteristics that they believe are important for partnership 
success: (i) long-term relationship and commitment, (ii) shared partnership 
vision and objectives, (iii) the right metrics and incentives, (iv) early 
acquisition of community involvement, (v) complementary skills and 
abilities, (vi) senior-level advocacy and support, (vii) sound business case 
analysis, (viii) mutual trust and shared risk, (ix) flexibility to change 
partnership scope, (x) balanced workload, (xi) independent review and 
oversight, (xii) enforcement of partnership decisions and requirements, 
(xiii) full coordination with all stakeholders, and (xiv) clearly documented 
objectives in partnering agreements.120 
Some of the notable successful DoD P3s have centered on partnerships 
related to in-service weapon systems, weapon systems development, 
arsenals, and multi-element product support.121 In August 2011, the United 
States Air Force’s Ogden Air Logistics Complex (“Ogden”), which repairs 
F-16 fighter aircraft components, needed to repair a dual-mode transmitter 
                                                                                                                           
 
115 GAO P3 STUDY, supra note 103, at 48. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 49. 
119 Guidebook, supra note 106, at 9. 
120 GAO P3 STUDY, supra note 103, at 14. 
121 Guidebook, supra note 106, at 21–23. 
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and thus formed a Direct-Sale partnership with Lockheed Martin to complete 
the work.122 The partnership was expected, among other things, to bring 
additional workload to Ogden beyond its support of the F-16 fleet at no 
additional cost to the Air Force.123 In a 2015 study, the GAO found that the 
P3s used at Ogden have also been used by other services and commodities in 
depot-level maintenance activities of components for aircrafts such as the 
Navy’s F/A-18 and its fire control radar.124 
Another notable DoD P3 is the Warner Robins Air Logistics 
Center/Lockheed Martin partnership relating to the Sniper Advanced 
Targeting Pod, which included the use of a Workshare method and resulted 
in Lockheed Martin assisting in depot activation. It also enabled the depot to 
begin performing organic maintenance.125 Other partnerships that the DoD 
has successfully used include: one with Lockheed Martin and Pratt & 
Whitney in the development of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, 
another with General Dynamics and Honeywell in the M1 Abrams 
modernization, and yet another with BAE Systems in the development of 
mine-resistant, ambush-protected (“MRAP”) technology and composite 
armor production in support of, and used in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 
protection of, the warfighter.126 
B. Corps of Engineers 
Dealing with significant budget shortcomings as it takes on the 
country’s civil works programs, and given the availability of private capital, 
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) has considered 
improving overall efficiency and reducing its financial burdens through use 
                                                                                                                           
 
122 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-249R, DEPOT MAINTENANCE: STATUS OF 
THE P3 FOR REPAIR OF THE DUAL-MODE TRANSMITTER IN THE F-16 FIRE-CONTROL RADAR (2015). 
123 Id. (In examining the benefits of the Ogden partnership with Lockheed Martin, the Air Force 
concluded, as part of a 2011 business-case analysis that the partnership work would help to maximize the 
use of the repair complex while also ensuring skill proficiency among artisans who repair the dual-mode 
transmitter. In addition, the Air Force concluded that the P3 would result in additional work in the repair 
complex, with the potential to generate $1.47 million of revenue per year with a reduction in the cost of 
operations and maintenance.). 
124 Id. (delineating that the Navy established a P3 for the repair of the F/A-18 fire control radar in 
2002). 
125 See generally id. 
126 Id. 
2017] THE USE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 145 
 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2017) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2017.122 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
of P3s.127 In fact, as it is responsible for the nation’s water infrastructure, the 
Corps is exploring the possibility of partnering with the private sector for 
completing and delivering the more than $60 billion backlog of outstanding 
projects involving America’s waterways and ports.128 This is a view 
expressed by the Army’s chief of engineers and the Corps’ commanding 
general, Lieutenant General Thomas Bostick, who understands the nature of 
the nation’s aging infrastructure and the need to outsource such repair 
projects to private commercial entities.129 Because the use of P3s would 
likely allow the Corps to address funding gaps and deliver projects at a faster 
and more efficient rate, the Corps would potentially be able to 
deliver/build/recapitalize more infrastructure for the public through leveraging 
private sector investments for optimal project delivery; develop a culture of 
innovation for global competitiveness through a highly partnered environment; 
improve value for money in infrastructure projects by creating incentives for best 
practice design, timely completion, and efficient operation via sharing project risk 
with the private sector; and improve the sustainability of infrastructure.130 
Driving these objectives and the Corps’ movement toward the use of 
P3s is legislation that is derived from the concerns raised by Illinois 
congressional delegates who sponsored bipartisan legislation in April 2013. 
That legislation, the Water Infrastructure Now P3 Act131 (“WINPPA”), 
                                                                                                                           
 
127 See Budget Constraints and the Corps’ Consideration of P3s: Where Is the Money Going to 
Come From?, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (Dec. 2008), http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/Portals/70/ 
docs/iwrreports/2008-P-1.pdf. 
128 See Lisa Ferdinando, Corps of Engineers Explores Public-Private Partnerships, ARMY NEWS 
SERV. (July 10, 2014), http://www.army.mil/article/129756/Corps_of_Engineers_explores_public 
_private_partnerships (outdated and deteriorating locks and dams along the Mississippi and Illinois rivers 
have contributed to a backlog of projects for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”), amounting 
to the $60 billion in unfunded, but necessary, upgrades); see also Ashley Rezin, Major Infrastructure 
Needs Along Mississippi & Illinois Rivers Prompt Bipartisan Legislation, PROGRESS ILLINOIS (July 5, 
2016), http://progressillinois.com/posts/content/2013/03/26/major-infrastructure-needs-along-
mississippi-and-illinois-rivers-prompt-bip. 
129 Id. 
130 See Ernest A. Drott, Presentation at the 4th Annual P3 Conference of the New Jersey Alliance 
for Action: USACE Water Infrastructure Public Private Partnerships (July 23, 2014), http://aiai-
infra.info/members-only/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Alt-Fin-P3-AIAI.pdf. 
131 The Water Infrastructure Now P3 Act, S. 566/H.R. 1153, 113th Cong. (2013) (sponsored by 
U.S. Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Mark Kirk (R-IL), the Act was assigned to the Senate Environment 
and Public Works Committee. It was also sponsored by U.S. Representatives Cheri Bustos and Rodney 
Davis (R, IL-13), and assigned to the House Transportation and Infrastructure subcommittee for Water 
Resources and Environment. Both bills, which died and were not enacted, would have directed the chief 
of engineers to establish a pilot program to evaluate the cost effectiveness and project delivery efficiency 
146 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 35:119 
 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2017) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2017.122 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
would encourage private investment to improve the nation’s water 
infrastructure. Recognizing that the Mississippi and Illinois rivers are critical 
to the economic well-being of the region, the need for expansion and 
modernization of the 80- to 90-year-old crumbling locks and dams of the 
rivers132 that help transport goods and products worldwide has become 
paramount. Thus, minimizing the significant backlog in the completion of 
projects along the rivers served as the impetus for the proposal of 
WINPPA.133 The WINPPA envisioned creating a five-year pilot program 
aimed at establishing partnerships between the Corps and private investors. 
The purpose of the pilot program is to explore alternative financing methods 
for modernizing infrastructure along the nation’s inland waterways, 
including the Mississippi and Illinois rivers, for exports of products such as 
steel, oil, coal, and agricultural exports, including corn and mulch.134 While 
the WINPPA was never enacted, it served as the impetus for the 
promulgation of the Water Resources Reform and Development Act 
(“WRRDA”) of 2014.135 
WRRDA is the primary legislation by which Congress authorizes the 
Corps of Engineers’ key civil works missions, including navigation, flood 
risk management, and environmental restoration, paving the way for federal, 
state, and local projects that maintain the United States’ ports, levees, dams, 
and harbors by authorizing $12.3 billion for such projects. The authorities 
provided in WRRDA assist the Corps in developing and maintaining the 
nation’s waterways and harbors, reducing damages from storm events, and 
restoring the environment. WRRDA, among other things, establishes a P3 
pilot program permitting private sector investment and participation in the 
financing, design, and/or construction of the Corps’ water infrastructure 
projects.136 
                                                                                                                           
 
of allowing non-federal interests to carry out authorized flood damage reduction, hurricane and storm 
damage reduction, and navigation projects.). 
132 See Rezin, supra note 128. Also note, a lock is a chamber in which water levels can be adjusted 
to transport boats between river and canal waterways with different levels. A dam is a barrier that manages 
water flow. 
133 The Water Infrastructure Now P3 Act, S. 566/H.R. 1153, 113th Cong. (2013). 
134 Id. 
135 See Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-121, 128 Stat. 
1193. 
136 Id. 
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The nation has a predicted need for investment of $600 billion and $1 
trillion in the coming decades to build up and improve our water and sewer 
infrastructure, making any P3 pilot program of significant importance. 
“Given the magnitude of capital needed and the critical nature of these 
projects, P3s seem to be an ideal structure for accomplishing the work, 
particularly given the current financial pressures faced by the government 
and its agencies.”137 
The Corps have been allowed to explore different methods of financing 
and delivery modalities under WRRDA, through the Water Infrastructure 
Finance and Innovation Act (“WIFIA”).138 With this authorization, the 
Corps’ main objective is to determine the best practices of persuading private 
partner participation in their projects. WIFIA is adapted from the Department 
of Transportation’s Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act139 and 
provides “low-interest federal loans and loan guarantees for major water 
infrastructure projects.”140 WRRDA also creates a separate 15-project pilot 
program—the Water Infrastructure P3 Program for the Army Corps of 
Engineers—to assess the use of P3s to accelerate the most critical water 
infrastructure projects. If WRRDA and its programs prove successful, it 
makes sense to expand such financing programs and encourage the use of 
P3s to fund projects addressing other sectors of the nation’s infrastructure. 
C. Transportation and Infrastructure 
In addition to the use of P3s in the DoD and Corps, there are a number 
of P3-related projects that fall under the purview of the Department of 
Transportation. Just a few of the transportation infrastructure projects 
benefiting from the P3 model include: the Indiana Toll Road; Chicago 
                                                                                                                           
 
137 Laura Fried-Studlo, Water Bill to Boost Public-Private Partnerships, GRAVEL2GRAVEL 
CONSTRUCTION & REAL EST. L. BLOG (June 10, 2014), http://www.gravel2gavel.com/2014/06/water-
bill-to-boost-public-private-partnerships.html. 
138 See Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-121, 128 Stat. 
1332. 
139 Id. 
140 TIFIA is a successful federal program that has supported major P3 transportation projects. Like 
TIFIA, WIFIA encourages P3s by making low-cost federal loans available to projects that include private 
partners, as long as the project is publicly sponsored and the local public agency supports it. By lowering 
the cost of public debt, these low-interest loans give projects more capacity to bring in equity or private 
debt. 
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Skyway; I-595 improvements near Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Capital Beltway 
(I-495) HOT (high occupancy toll) lanes project in northern Virginia; 
Hudson-Bergen Light Rail in New Jersey; Port of Miami Tunnel in Miami; 
Ohio River Bridges East project connecting the east end of Louisville, 
Kentucky, near Prospect, to southern Indiana near Utica; and the Goethals 
Bridge Replacement Project connecting Staten Island, New York, to 
Elizabeth, New Jersey.141 These projects, more importantly, also benefit from 
Department of Transportation Infrastructure Finance & Innovation Act 
(“TIFIA”), which is a federal government loan for the implementation of 
infrastructure projects.142 
The $2 billion North Tarrant Express A is a leading and recent example 
in the use of the P3 model for transportation infrastructure development. 
North Tarrant Express A is a design/build/finance/operate project to manage 
lanes and upgrade existing facilities on 13 miles of interstate in the Dallas-
Fort Worth Metro area.143 This project is financed by $650 million in TIFIA 
loans, $427 million in private equity, $400 million in private activity bonds, 
and $573 million in state funds.144 
Notwithstanding these projects and others, “private investment in U.S. 
highways and transit has been modest in comparison to spending by all levels 
of [the federal] government.”145 A 2014 panel on P3s composed of members 
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
Representatives found that “using P3s for the delivery of surface 
transportation projects in the United States is a fairly recent trend.”146 The 
2014 panel also acknowledged P3s’ importance to both the development and 
delivery of transportation and infrastructure projects.147 The panel found that 
the successful P3 projects share several factors, including “leveraging the 
                                                                                                                           
 
141 Robert Poole, Jr., Annual Privatization Report 2014 Surface Transportation, REASON FOUND. 
5 (2014), http://reason.org/files/apr-2014-surface-transportation.pdf. 
142 See ROBERT KIRK & WILLIAM MALLETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42877, FUNDING AND 
FINANCING HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION 22–24 (2013), https://www.asphaltpavement.org/ 
michele/CRS%20report.pdf. 
143 Build America Transportation Investment Center (BATIC): North Tarrant Express Segments 1 
& 2A, U.S. DEP’T. TRANSP. (July 5, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/policy-initiatives/build-
america/north-tarrant-express-segments-1-2a-dallas-fort-worth-tx. 
144 Id. 
145 KIRK & MALLETT, supra note 142, at 23. 
146 TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 5, at 24. 
147 Id. 
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strengths of the public and private sectors, appropriate risk transfer, 
transparent and flexible contracts, and alignment of policy goals.”148 
Internationally, P3s have been used more frequently, but have also yielded 
mixed results.149 
Despite a United States municipal bond market of $3.7 trillion, a 
significant amount of which is allocated for infrastructure financing, the 
infrastructure needs of the nation are well into the billions.150 The panel 
suggested the following steps to improve P3s: 
● establish a Transportation Procurement Office (“TPO”) to work 
with agencies to implement P3 best practices, including sample 
model contracts. The TPO would issue best practices for 
standardizing state P3 authorities, including fair and balanced 
assumptions made in the calculations, consistency on unsolicited 
bids, non-compete clauses, and other substantive elements; 
● limit project delays and budget overruns; 
● guarantee “more accountable expenditure of taxpayer dollars over 
the life cycle of the project”; 
● direct the TPO to develop and implement performance standards 
for project delivery for P3 projects falling under the committee’s 
jurisdiction; 
● require the DOT to have its state equivalents compile and submit 
annual reports on projects that receive federal funds; 
● require the DOT to make state transportation annual reports 
available to the public and give Congress information on project 
performance data and national trends; 
● facilitate the DOT’s progress in the Moving Ahead for Progress in 
the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) (P.L. 112-141) to encourage 
“simplification and standardization of P3 contracts”; 
● encourage the DOT to collaborate with and support other federal, 
state, and local agencies to share information about P3s; 
● encourage collaboration by states to realize common infrastructure 
objectives; and 
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● form P3s early in projects to, among other things, form community 
consensus.151 
Given the nation’s infrastructure need to pave the way for greater P3 use 
in surface transportation projects, President Obama signed into law the 
Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (“FAST”).152 This legislation, 
which became law on December 4, 2015, calls for spending $305 billion over 
fiscal years 2016 through 2020 for highways, highway and motor vehicle 
safety, public transportation, motor carrier safety, hazardous materials safety, 
rail, and research, technology, and statistics programs. 
D. Homeland Security 
The emergence of P3s in homeland security can be traced back to the 
19th century, where the recovery from various disasters resulted in a 
collaborative effort between federal, state, and local governments with the 
private sector.153 The Great Chicago Fire of 1871, the 1906 San Francisco 
Earthquake, and the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 saw significant 
interaction and exchange of funding from the private to the public sector in 
support of post-disaster reconstruction.154 The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (“FEMA”), created during the Carter Administration, 
in responding to tragic events such as September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 
Hurricane Katrina, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, has contributed to 
enhancing the prominent and expansive role the P3 model has played in 
securing the homeland. 
In the case of the 9/11 attacks, Verizon Wireless played a key role in 
rebuilding the communications network infrastructure to re-open the New 
                                                                                                                           
 
151 Id. at 13. 
152 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312. 
153 Nathan E. Busch & Austen D. Givens, Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: 
Opportunities and Challenges, HOMELAND SEC. AFFAIRS (Oct. 2012), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/233. 
154 Steve Bowen & Elizabeth Witham, Financing Recovery from Catastrophic Events: Final 
Report, HOMELAND SEC. INST. (Mar. 30, 2007), https://recoverydiva.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/ 
financing_recovery_hsi-2007.pdf. 
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York Stock Exchange.155 In response to Hurricane Katrina, Walmart played 
a significant role in providing relief supplies to Gulf residents.156 
The vital nature of P3s and how they contribute to securing the 
homeland is proven when studies show that the private sector manages and 
controls almost 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure.157 Thus, it is 
apparent that the security of the nation’s critical infrastructure, especially in 
relation to national security, requires an effective partnership framework that 
fosters integrated, collaborative engagement and interaction among public 
and private sector partners. 
In furtherance of this view, Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21)158 
and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013159 provide the 
overarching framework using, among other things, the P3 model for a 
structured partnership approach between the government and the private 
sector for the protection, security, and resilience of critical infrastructure. 
Through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Office of 
Infrastructure Protection (OIP),160 along with the Critical Infrastructure 
                                                                                                                           
 
155 Dave Lenckus, Verizon Quickly Restored Service After Terrorist Attacks, BUS. INS. (Apr. 6, 
2003), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20030406/AWARDS03/100012615. 
156 Steven Horwitz, Wal-Mart to the Rescue: Private Enterprise’s Response to Hurricane Katrina, 
INDEP. REV. (2009), https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_13_04_3_horwitz.pdf. 
157 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-39, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: 
PROGRESS COORDINATING GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR EFFORTS VARIES BY SECTORS’ 
CHARACTERISTICS (2006), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-39. 
158 Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience: PPD-21, THE 
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-
policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil [hereinafter PPD-21] (PPD-21, titled “Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” directs that the federal government shall work with critical 
infrastructure owners and operators (including the private sector entities) . . . “to take proactive steps to 
manage risk and strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure, considering 
all hazards that could have a debilitating impact on national security, economic stability, public health and 
safety, or any combination thereof. These efforts shall seek to reduce vulnerabilities, minimize 
consequences, identify and disrupt threats, and hasten response and recovery efforts related to critical 
infrastructure.”). 
159 National Infrastructure Protection Plan: NIPP 2013 Partnering for Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 6, 2016), http://www.dhs.gov/national-
infrastructure-protection-plan (outlining the ways in which government and private sector participants in 
the critical infrastructure community work together to manage risks and achieve security and resilience 
outcomes). 
160 See Busch & Givens, supra note 153 (stating that OIP, within DHS, works on threat and 
vulnerability analyses, national and local coordination with businesses and government agencies, and risk 
mitigation). 
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Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC),161 the federal government engages 
in P3s relying on firms like SAIC, Booz Allen Hamilton, Northrop 
Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Microsoft, Bank of America, and VISA.162 
These private companies work to enhance critical infrastructure protection 
with a primary focus on “cyber security, port security, emergency 
management, chemicals, commercial facilities, critical manufacturing, dams, 
emergency services, and nuclear reactor sectors, materials, and waste.”163 
Indeed, in recent times, P3s have become a high priority, resulting in 
equipping DHS with initiatives to create greater relations between the federal 
government and the business community.164 
IX. FACILITATING OTHER USES OF P3S 
A. White House Initiative to Expand P3s 
During the Obama Administration an attempt was made to stimulate 
growth in transportation and other related infrastructure projects by 
launching of a government-wide initiative—the Build America Investment 
Initiative.165 This initiative was announced in furtherance of the 
administration’s policy and “. . . the policy of the Federal Government for all 
agencies to facilitate, as appropriate, greater public and private partnership 
and collaboration, including with international investors and companies, to 
develop, improve, and maintain infrastructure across the country where and 
when economically and environmentally beneficial and in the public 
interest.”166 
                                                                                                                           
 
161 Id. CIPAC is the organizational framework, which includes such companies as Verizon, the 
Boeing Company, Google, and government agencies such as the United States Department of Justice, 
Department of Commerce, and Environmental Protection Agency, through which the federal government 
and private sector representatives exchange and coordinate critical infrastructure information. Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 See FACT SHEET: Building a 21st Century Infrastructure: Increasing Public and Private 
Collaboration with the Build America Investment Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 17, 2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/17/fact-sheet-building-21st-century-
infrastructure-increasing-public-and-pr. 
166 See Presidential Memorandum—Expanding Public-Private Collaboration on Infrastructure 
Development and Financing, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 17, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/07/17/presidential-memorandum-expanding-public-private-collaboration-infrastru. 
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Among other things, the initiative, as further memorialized by 
Presidential Memorandum, created an Infrastructure Finance Working Group 
(“Working Group”) that would “. . . assess the ways in which public-private 
collaborations can best support economically transformative investments, 
improve project delivery, expand economic opportunity, increase resilience 
and sustainability, advance regional infrastructure development plans, and 
encourage innovation in the infrastructure sector.”167 
Infrastructure, however, is not the only sector where the White House 
has seen opportunity to leverage P3s. In March 2015, President Obama 
announced his plan to rebuild and fortify the American manufacturing 
industry through public-private investments of $500 million.168 With the 
DoD leading various competitions focused on innovative technologies that 
could benefit the manufacturing industry, the Obama administration’s plan 
increased small manufacturer’s capabilities.169 
The Obama administration’s steadfast focus on leveraging P3s extended 
even into the areas of social reform and creating access to high-speed 
broadband for all citizens at all economic levels. Recognizing that “. . . a lack 
of [I]nternet access is a denial of access to basic education and employment 
resources,”170 in 27 cities across the nation, citizens will now have the 
opportunity to be connected to high-speed broadband through a pilot project 
titled the ConnectHome initiative.171 
In furtherance of the Obama administration’s initiative, P3s are figuring 
prominently in the current administration’s plan to repair and modernize 
United States infrastructure as a priority including, roads, bridges, airports 
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169 Id. (“The president launched the ninth manufacturing hub competition in Cleveland, Ohio, and 
announced measures to strengthen the small manufacturers that power America’s supply chains . . . . The 
first institute awarded is in Youngstown, Ohio. Only in its third year, it is already drawing investment to 
Ohio—including a $32 million job-creating investment in the region from GE—and advancing research 
that will help accelerate the speed of 3-D printing in metals by a factor of 10.”). 
170 REALESTATERAMA, Booker, Menendez Praise White House Announcement of ConnectHome 
Program to Expand Broadband Access (July 16, 2015), http://newjersey.realestaterama.com/2015/07/16/ 
booker-menendez-praise-white-house-announcement-of-connecthome-program-to-expand-broadband-
access-ID01808.html. 
171 Id. 
154 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 35:119 
 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2017) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2017.122 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
and water systems. This plan, which is a key part of the current 
administration’s economic proposal, includes spending $1 trillion over 10 
years and purports to open the door to significant private sector investment 
under the auspices of P3s.172 Private investment and the formation of P3s in 
this context recognizes the need to address limited government resources 
while also transferring project risk. The Trump administration intends to 
incentivize private sector investment in infrastructure and spur development 
and construction by providing tax credits which will ultimately lower the cost 
of financing projects. The extent to which the current administration will be 
successful in facilitating P3 projects for significant infrastructure projects 
remains to be seen as President Trump provides more details of his plan 
during the latter part of 2017. This approach is consistent with many states’ 
practice of enacting laws to authorize private investment infrastructure 
projects and a full range of P3s.173 
B. Congressional P3 Action 
Congress has been more recently engaged in seeking ways in which P3s 
may serve to facilitate greater infrastructure development within the 
government. For example, the Congressional P3 Caucus, a bipartisan 
congressional caucus, has been established to explore how to expand the role 
of P3s in transportation infrastructure as well as defense, energy, technology, 
and water.174 Representative Mike Rogers (R-Alabama), co-chair of the 
caucus, cites raising awareness of infrastructure issues and examining P3s 
across the country as an objective of the caucus and as a response to the 
challenge resulting from the “severe crisis” in infrastructure funding in this 
country.175 
Consistent with the caucus’s objectives, members of the House, led by 
caucus co-chair Representative John Delaney (D-Maryland), co-introduced 
the Partnership to Build America Act (H.R. 2084) (the “PBAA”).176 If 
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passed, the PBAA would finance $750 billion in infrastructure investment 
using no appropriated funds. 
The goal of the PBAA in stimulating P3s is to finance rebuilding the 
United States transportation, energy, communications, water, and education 
infrastructure through the creation of an infrastructure fund using repatriated 
corporate earnings, as well as through using P3s. The legislation would lead 
to the creation of the American Infrastructure Fund (“AIF”), which would be 
funded by “the sale of $50 billion worth of infrastructure bonds having a 50-
year term at a fixed interest rate of 1 percent, and would not be guaranteed 
by the U.S. government.”177 The AIF would “provide loans or guarantees to 
state or local governments to finance qualified infrastructure projects and the 
states or local governments would be required to pay back the loans at a 
market rate determined by the AIF, to ensure they have ‘skin in the game.’178 
Additionally, the AIF would invest in equity securities for projects in 
partnership with states or local governments.” 
The PBAA requires, among other things, 25 percent of AIF funded 
projects be P3s. Of that 25 percent, it is required that at least 20 percent of 
P3 funding is received from private investments. The potential benefits of the 
PBAA are that it would 
create a large-scale infrastructure financing capability with zero federal 
appropriations; lead to significant jobs in the short term and help U.S. 
competitiveness in the long-term; allow for repatriation while ensuring U.S. 
corporations’ tax savings are truly invested in the U.S. economy to grow quality 
jobs; push the project selection decisions down to state and local governments 
who have skin in the game; and encourage and create a framework for growth in 
P3s. 
X. P3S IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 
State and local governments have seen the benefits of P3s as well and 
are taking a more serious look at P3s as a means of delivering critical 
infrastructure development and other essential services to citizens. A recent 
report stated that the three primary forces driving the emerging P3 market in 
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the states are: “the rapid deterioration of nearly all types of infrastructure in 
every state, investment shortfalls for building and rebuilding vital public 
systems, and a growing population’s increasing burden upon existing 
systems.”179 State and local governments who are closer to their constituents 
witness and feel the urgency for rebuilding. And though our federalist system 
places the lion’s share of the burden on them to repair crumbling 
infrastructure, states have broad leeway to adopt innovative solutions. 
Acknowledging state and local government concerns, on August 10 
and 11, 2007, during the American Bar Association’s 2007 Annual Meeting, 
the council of the Section of Public Contract Law and the Council of the 
Section of State and Local Government Law approved the 2007 Model Code 
for Public Infrastructure Procurement (“2007 MC PIP”) and urged its 
consideration by units of state and local government that have responsibility 
for the provision of infrastructure services and facilities.180 
Many states have gone on to enact their own P3 infrastructure 
statutes.181 In passing its own P3 infrastructure statute, the California 
legislature candidly acknowledged the problems facing the state and the need 
to swiftly embrace P3 agreements: 
Local governmental agencies have experienced a significant decrease in available 
tax revenues to fund necessary infrastructure improvements. If local governmental 
agencies are going to maintain the quality of life that this infrastructure provides, 
they must find new funding sources. One source of new money is private sector 
investment capital utilized to design, construct, maintain, rebuild, repair, and 
operate infrastructure facilities. Unless private sector investment capital becomes 
available to study, plan, design, construct, develop, finance, maintain, rebuild, 
improve, repair, or operate, or any combination thereof, fee-producing 
infrastructure facilities, some local governmental agencies will be unable to 
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replace deteriorating infrastructure. Further, some local governmental agencies 
will be unable to expand and build new infrastructure facilities to serve the 
increasing population.182 
In realizing the benefits of P3s, states are turning to the private sector. 
To this end, “thirty-three states have passed a variety of P3 laws, but many 
are only related to specific projects.”183 Arizona, for example, has adopted a 
broad P3 transportation statute allowing its Department of Transportation to 
enter into P3 agreements relating to facilities used for the safe transport of 
people, information, or goods.184 The legislature authorizes the department 
to enter into multiple forms of agreements that the department concludes will 
serve the public interest.185 
Florida is another state that has broad P3 legislation authorizing the 
Department of Transportation to “enter into agreements with private entities, 
or a consortia thereof, for the building, operation, ownership, or financing of 
transportation facilities.”186 
Alaska, on the other hand, does not have a comprehensive P3 
infrastructure statute and is an example of a state that has enacted only a 
project-specific P3 statute.187 The Knik Arm Bridge and Toll Authority Act 
allows the Authority to enter into P3 agreements relating to the operation of 
the Knik Arm Bridge in Alaska and its appurtenant facilities.188 
The state of Nevada has enacted a broader P3 statute than Alaska’s, but 
still limited in scope. The statute allows the state government to enter into P3 
agreements to develop transportation facilities, but does not allow the state 
to enter into P3s to develop “a toll bridge or toll road.”189 
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Pennsylvania is another leading state utilizing P3s to engage the private 
sector in the development of infrastructure.190 This includes utilizing P3s to 
replace bridges, develop ports, and build CNG fueling stations. For example, 
the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation is involved in working with 
a private sector consortium for the replacement of 600 structurally deficient 
bridges. In addition to this $1.1 billion project, the governor, working 
through the Philadelphia Regional Port Authority, is developing plans for 
facilities that would support and service the automobile industry and an 
import-export facility for crude oil.191 What distinguishes Pennsylvania’s P3 
legislation from that which exists in many other states is its allowance for 
private sector submission of unsolicited proposals for P3 projects. 
Many experts believe some states’ hesitation to adopt broader P3 
statutes stems from concern that the interests of profit-driven private 
developers may not always align with those of the public. Notwithstanding 
these concerns, some communities have embraced the P3 model as the 
vehicle for realistic change when budgets continue to get cut and 
infrastructure continues to deteriorate. For example, the small rural town of 
Westminster, Maryland, utilized P3s and private investment to overcome the 
disadvantage of poor Internet access and connectivity. In exchange for 
internet access, the private partner was afforded exclusivity based on a fixed 
period or a certain volume of Internet subscriptions.192 It also created an 
opportunity to engage in a P3 arrangement that resulted in a private partner 
investing in next-generation access. The Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, area is 
another local use of P3s in the development of Internet infrastructure.193 The 
benefits of P3s have been realized by even the nation’s capital. In November 
2015, Mayor Muriel Bowser officially launched the District’s Office of 
Public-Private Partnerships.194 As residential development in the District 
expands, so does the need for infrastructural improvement.195 Mayor Bowser 
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acknowledged this need and promotes the new Office as a vehicle to bridge 
the gap between the public’s need for infrastructural development and the 
capability of the private sector to take part in it.196 
To protect their citizens, state legislatures have implemented various 
provisions to maintain some degree of reserved control throughout the P3 
process. Arizona, for example, has identified eight factors that must be 
considered before an agency can even enter into a P3 agreement. They 
include: 
(1) the ability of the eligible facility to improve safety, reduce congestion, increase 
capacity, and promote economic growth; (2) the proposed cost and financial plan 
for the eligible facility; (3) the general reputation, qualifications, industry 
experience, and financial capacity of the private partner; (4) the proposed design, 
operation, and feasibility of the eligible facility; (5) comments from users, local 
citizens, and affected jurisdictions; (6) benefits to the public; (7) the safety record 
of the private partner; and (8) other criteria that the department deems 
appropriate.197 
Once a project is complete, many fear that private developers will take 
advantage of the public by increasing tolls on highways being developed 
pursuant to P3 agreements. After all, although P3s “can offer alternative 
project delivery methods or financing mechanisms,” the National Conference 
of State Legislatures (“NCSL”) has said, “revenues to repay the private 
investment must come from the same sources of public financing—tolls, 
fees, or taxes.”198 State legislatures have passed a number of regulations to 
protect the public from such exploitation. Arkansas, for example, allows the 
state Highway Commission “to fix and enforce the schedule or rate of tolls 
to be collected on any privately owned toll bridge located on any road 
embraced in the state highway system.”199 Arkansas expressly commands 
that the interest of the owner and the public should be balanced, so the owner 
receives “a fair return on the value of his or her property, and the public shall 
not be required to pay more than is required to net such return.”200 
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California requires that lease agreements “establish specific toll or user 
fee rates” and any proposed increase in tolls or rates not set forth in the lease 
agreement “shall first be approved by the department or regional 
transportation agency, as appropriate, after at least one public hearing 
conducted at a location near the proposed or existing facility.”201 California 
also ensures minimum standards for public welfare by mandating that P3 
agreements relating to the state highway system “meet all requirements for 
noise mitigation, landscaping, pollution control, and safety that otherwise 
would apply if the department were designing, building, and operating the 
facility.”202 
Another point of disagreement among some of the states is whether 
agencies and departments are allowed to entertain unsolicited proposals. 
Unsolicited proposals can be controversial, because the generally recognized 
purpose of P3s is to rely on the private sector only when there is an urgent 
need for such projects. However, Colorado allows its department of 
transportation to solicit and entertain unsolicited proposals.203 Many other 
states also allow their agencies to accept both solicited and unsolicited 
proposals. These states include: Arizona,204 California,205 Delaware,206 
Florida,207 Louisiana,208 Maine,209 Minnesota,210 Mississippi,211 Missouri,212 
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Utah,213 Oregon,214 Virginia,215 and Washington.216 Georgia and Indiana do 
not allow their state agencies to accept unsolicited proposals.217 
XI. CONCLUSION: P3S IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING TOMORROW 
The use of P3s in government contracting is a concept that is well 
established. With new financial pressures on federal, state, and local 
agencies, many agencies have a renewed focus on P3s as a means to reduce 
operating budgets and minimize deficits by turning operations and 
maintenance responsibilities over to private sector companies. As federal, 
state, and local governments look to ensure efficiencies in the delivery of 
goods and services, and the intersection between the public sector and private 
contractors is facilitated through P3 initiatives, there will be increased 
opportunities for government contractors. 
It is anticipated that P3 projects will ultimately result in a new trillion-
dollar government marketplace,218 with the impact primarily in the area of 
defense, as well as transportation and infrastructure development. Indeed, 
P3s are sweeping the country, not only changing government contracting 
practices and the way in which the government does business, but also 
addressing socioeconomic concerns, resulting in a fuller and more engaged 
and interactive life for citizens. Despite being a mainstay, P3s have also 
become an increasingly important and promising tool for leveraging private 
funds to meet investment and funding needs. P3s are indeed becoming an 
important component in the toolkit of developing partnerships for the 
efficient delivery of goods and services to the government.219 
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